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I. INTRODUCTION
There is no doubt that America's increasing drug problem now af-
fects the unborn.1 An estimated 750,000 fetuses are exposed to a vari-
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REvrEw.
1. See generally Kristen Barrett, Prosecuting Pregnant Addicts for Dealing to the
Unborn, 33 ARIz. L. REv. 221 (1991).
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ety of illegal substances each year.2 This represents an enormous
increase from 5,000 in 1977.3 Some individual cities have experienced
almost a three thousand percent increase in the number of infants ex-
posed to drugs over the past several years.4 Overall, between ten and
fifteen percent of all newborns in the United States have some type of
illegal substance in their bodies at birth.5
As a result of these staggering numbers, authorities across the
country are struggling to find ways to deal with this problem. Many
jurisdictions have attempted to use child endangerment statutes to
impose criminal sanctions on women for ingesting illegal substances
while they are pregnant. 6 In fact, prosecutors have brought hundreds
of criminal proceedings against women under these statutes since the
early 1990s. 7 These prosecutions have spawned a number of emotion-
ally charged debates concerning complex issues.8 These issues in-
clude whether existing statutes give proper notice to a pregnant
woman that she can be prosecuted for harming her fetus; whether
prosecuting a pregnant woman violates her right to privacy; and
whether criminal sanctions actually promote the interests of the un-
born or in fact create more harm. To date, Whitner v. State9 is the
only case in which a court has upheld the imposition of criminal sanc-
2. Karina Bland, Children on Crack are Starting to Hit Schools 'Like A Bomb,"
ARiz. REPUBLIC, April 21, 1996, at Al.
3. The Use of Drugs During Pregnancy: Hearings Before the House Select Committee
on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 96th Cong. 1 (1980)(statement of Representative
Collins).
4. See Louise Marlane Chan, S.O.S. From the Womb: A Call for New York Legisla-
tion Criminalizing Drug Use During Pregnancy, 21 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 199, 199
(1993)(stating that in New York City alone more than 15,000 babies will be born
with illegal drugs in their systems, which represents a 3000% increase over the
last 6 years).
5. See Margaret P. Spencer, Prosecutorial Immunity: The Response to Prenatal
Drug Use, 25 CoNN. L. REv. 393, 393 (1993).
6. See, e.g., Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); In re
Valerie D., 613 A.2d 748 (Conn. 1992); State v. Dunn, 916 P.2d 952 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1996). See also Sonja C. Davig, Crack-Cocaine Babies: Protecting Society's
Innocent Victims, 15 HAmLnNE J. PuB. L. & PoL'Y 281, 291-94 (1994)(noting that
prosecutors have tried without much success to prosecute mothers under con-
trolled substance statutes).
7. See Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 278
(1990).
8. See, e.g., Michael A. Hammer, The Constitutional, Judicial and Social Pitfalls
Attendant to the Criminalization of Prenatal Maternal Substance Abuse: A Plea
for Governmental Uniformity and Mercy, 22 SETON HALL L. REv. 1456 (1992);
Janna C. Merrick, Maternal Substance Abuse During Pregnancy: Policy Implica-
tions in the United States, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 57 (1993); Timothy Sean McBride,
Criminal Law-Should States Criminally Prosecute Mothers for Delivering Drugs
to Their Newborns During the Birthing Process?, 27 SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 251
(1993); James Denison, Note, The Efficacy and Constitutionality of Criminal Pun.
ishment for Maternal Substance Abuse, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1103 (1991).
9. No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164 (S.C. July 15, 1996).
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tions on a woman under child endangerment statutes for the damage
caused to her fetus as a result of ingesting an illegal drug during her
pregnancy.
This Comment argues that the criminal sanctions imposed by the
South Carolina Supreme Court in Whitner do not really protect the
potential life of the fetus from damage caused by its mother's drug
abuse. First, this Comment discusses the harm caused to the fetus
when a pregnant woman ingests an illegal substance.iO Second, it
sets forth the background regarding the rights that the common law
has afforded the unborn with respect to harm to the fetus by someone
other than the mother." Third, it provides an overview of the key
cases from various jurisdictions that have decided whether or not to
impose criminal sanctions on women for prenatal substance abuse.'
2
Fourth, an analysis of the reasoning in Whitner is provided.'3 The
first two sections of analysis focus on the method of statutory interpre-
tation employed by the Whitner court with respect to possible viola-
tions of the doctrine of separation of powers and the right to due
process.' 4 The third section of analysis addresses the implications of a
woman's right to privacy.' 5 This Comment concludes that, even if
constitutional, imposing criminal sanctions in these cases is not the
best policy option.' 6
II. EFFECTS OF DRUG ABUSE ON A FETUS
The damage caused to the fetus by its mother's illegal substance
abuse is truly devastating. When a pregnant woman ingests a drug, it
disrupts the flow of blood through the placenta and causes numerous
problems.' 7 Once the drug passes into the fetus's system, the drug
remains there and does not recirculate into the mother's system.' 8
Because the fetus is so small and undeveloped, it cannot discard the
drug as quickly as an adult. As a result, the ill effects of the drug are
magnified many times over, and the fetus becomes much more ad-
dicted than its mother.' 9 As the drug circulates through the fetus, the
10. See infra Part H.
11. See infra Part EI.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Parts V and VI.
14. See infra sections VIA and VI.B.
15. See infra section VI.C.
16. See infra Part VII.
17. See Stacy L. Best, Fetal Equality?: The Equality State's Response to the Chal-
lenge of Protecting Unborn Children, 32 LAND & WATER L. REv. 193, 194-95
(1997).
18. Michele D. Wilkins, Solving the Problem of Prenatal Substance Abuse: An Anal-
ysis of Punitive and Rehabilitative Approaches, 39 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1402 (1990).
19. Emmalee S. Bandstra, Medical Issues for Mothers and Infants Arising from Per-
inatal Use of Cocaine, in DRuG EXPOSED INFANTS AND THEi FAmEs: CoOmnI-
199'7]
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fetus's blood pressure rises while the fetus's ability to receive oxygen
from its mother decreases. 20 As a result, the fetus often hemorrhages
and is born prematurely. 21 At birth, the child may encounter agoniz-
ing convulsions, deformities, mental retardation, and neurological
problems.2 2 Further, the frequency of crib death increases dramati-
cally for babies exposed to drugs while in their mother's womb.
23
Fetuses exposed to drugs experience a very difficult time interact-
ing with their parents and other children later in their lives.24 In ad-
dition, these children often require specialized attention from teachers
trained to instruct the developmentally challenged. Most of the time
such attention is too costly and unavailable. 25 In short, in a large
number of cases, the harmful effects of the mother's drug abuse in-
vades the womb and continues to haunt the child throughout his
lifetime.
III. FETAL RIGHTS CONCERNING ACTS COMMITTED BY
THIRD PARTIES
Although not identical, the application of tort and criminal laws to
third persons committing acts against a fetus are related and are dis-
cussed by the courts in prosecutions against the mother who harms
her fetus. 26 Therefore, a brief background of these areas of law is
helpful. The development of fetal rights has been a complex process. 27
In tort law cases, courts in the United States traditionally did not al-
low recovery for prenatal injuries 28 because a child en ventre sa mere29
was not a person and had no existence under law.
NATING RESPONSES OF THE LEGAL, MEDICAL, AND CHILD PROTECTION SYSTEM 22
(1990).
20. Patricia A. Sexton, Imposing Criminal Sanctions on Pregnant Drug Users:
Throwing the Baby Out with the Bath Water, 32 WASHBURN L.J. 410, 416 (1993).
21. James M. Wilton, Compelled Hospitalization and Treatment During Pregnancy:
Mental Health Statutes as Models for Legislation to Protect Children from Prena-
tal Drug and Alcohol Exposure, 25 FAm. L.Q. 149 (1991).
22. Id.
23. Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood: Feminist Theory and State Regulation of Preg-
nancy, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1325, 1343 n.1 (1990).
24. See Margaret P. Spencer, Prosecutorial Immunity: The Response to Prenatal
Drug Use, 25 Com. L. REv. 393,398-401 (1993); Douglas J. Besharov, Whose Life
Is It, Anyway? Pregnant Crack Users Act as Child Abusers, NAT'L L.J., March 4,
1991, at 15.
25. See Spencer, supra note 24.
26. See, e.g., State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992).
27. See Agota Peterfy, Fetal Viability as a Threshold to Personhood, 16 J. LEGAL
MED. 607, 621-27 (1995).
28. See, e.g., Drobner v. Peters, 133 N.E. 567 (N.Y. 1921).
29. A child en ventre sa mere is a child still in its mother's womb. BLAcIes LAw Dic-
TIONARY 534 (6th ed. 1990).
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The creation of at least two theories of fetal rights, however, modi-
fied early tort law. The first theory required that the child be born
alive to recover for prenatal injuries,30 while the second theory al-
lowed recovery for any injuries inflicted after the fetus reached viabil-
ity.3 ' The "born alive" theory failed to distinguish between viability
and nonviability. This theory allowed the fetus to maintain a tort ac-
tion for injuries sustained while in the womb so long as the fetus sub-
sequently was born alive.32 The "viability" theory, on the other hand,
granted the fetus an independent existence at viability, and an action
in tort could be maintained for injuries inflicted after viability even if
the fetus subsequently was not born alive.33 Currently, "the trend in
most states has been to do away with the born alive rule altogether"
34
and instead employ the viability theory.
In criminal law, the historical approach to acts committed against
the fetus by third parties has been the cause of some controversy. For
example, in Keeler v. Superior Court,3 5 the majority and dissenting
opinions disagreed on what the common law actually held with re-
spect to acts committed against a fetus by third parties. Keeler in-
volved a case in which a man intentionally shoved his knee into the
abdomen of a woman who he knew was pregnant and thereby termi-
nated the potential life of the fetus.36 The man was charged with
murder under a statute that defined murder as "the unlawful killing
of a human being."37 The majority in Keeler held that the legislative
intent and existing case law did not allow the words "human being" in
the statute to include a viable fetus.38 The majority concluded that
the statute could not be read to include a fetus without violating the
man's due process rights. The dissent disagreed, however, holding
that its reading of the common law did provide adequate notice that
the term "human being" included a fetus.
It should be noted that after Keeler, the California Legislature
amended the homicide statute at issue to state that "[miurder is the
unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus."39 It can be argued that
this subsequent legislative act casts doubt on the majority's analysis
concerning the legislature's intent in passing the original murder stat-
30. See Amann v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d 412 (11l. 1953)(discussing both theories).
31. See Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, 65 S.E.2d 909 (Ga. 1951).
32. See, e.g., Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951).
33. See, e.g., Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, 65 S.E.2d 909 (Ga. 1951).
34. Stephanie Stone, Michigan Court Oks Homicide Charges in Death of Baby Kept
Alive Two Hours on Respirator, WEST LEGAL NEws, Dec. 20, 1995, at 567, avail-
able in 1995 WL 860877.
35. 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
36. Id. at 618.
37. Id. at 619 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (1969)).
38. Id. at 625-26.
39. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988)(amended 1970)(emphasis added).
1997] 323
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ute. That is, by amending the statute to expressly include fetus imme-
diately after Keeler was decided, the legislature had intended a fetus
to fall within the scope of the homicide statute prior to Keeler and the
legislature simply was reacting to the court's holding. On the other
hand, it just as easily can be argued that the legislature agreed with
the majority in Keeler in that the common law did not define a "human
being" to include a fetus and decided to change the common law by a
legislative act. This argument is supported by the actual language of
the statute because the legislature did not amend the statute to state
that "human being" includes a fetus. Rather, the amended version
states that "murder" is "the unlawful killing of a human being, or a
fetus."
Both the majority and the dissent in Keeler relied upon the well-
known commentators Coke and Blackstone. The majority cited these
authors in support of its conclusion that the early common law of Eng-
land and the United States did not hold that a fetus was a human
being for criminal purposes. 40 "If a woman be quick4 l with childe and
... a man beat her, whereby the childe dyeth in her body, and she is
delivered of a dead childe, this is . . .no murder ... for in law it is
accounted a reasonable creature, in rerum natura, when it is born
alive."42 The Keeler majority concluded that "it was thus 'well settled'
in American case law that the killing of an unborn child was not a
homicide."43
The dissent in Keeler, however, opined that the common law did
support a current finding that "human being" included a fetus. The
dissent based this conclusion on Blackstone's and Coke's statements
that killing a quickened fetus was "a great misprision."44 The dissent
acknowledged that the term "great misprision" did not mean the same
thing as murder. 45 Nevertheless, the dissent argued that the phrase
described a crime and therefore served to give notice that such action
was criminal in nature.4 6 Furthermore, the dissent noted that
"although the common law did not apply the [label of 'murder'] to the
killing of a quickened fetus, it appears that this 'great misprision' was
severely punished."47 The dissent provided other authority to support
40. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 620 (Cal. 1970).
41. Id. at 620 n.5 (stating that quickening is said to occur when the fetus first "stirs
in the womb," ordinarily between the 16th and 18th week of pregnancy).
42. Id. at 620 (citing 3 CoKE, INSTITUTES 58 (1648)). Coke's "born alive" requirement
was expanded by both Blackstone and Hale. Id.
43. Id. at 621.
44. Id. at 630.
45. Id. at 631.
46. Id. (citing the majority opinion which stated that "great misprision" was the
equivalent of a misdemeanor).
47. Id. The dissent stated that "[a]s late as 1837, the wilful aborting of a woman
quick with child was punishable by death in England." Id. (citing Lord Land-
sdowne's Act of 1828, 9 Geo. 4, ch. 31 (Eng.)).
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its conclusion that the common law defined the term 'human being" to
include a fetus.48 Therefore, as illustrated by Keeler, controversy sur-
rounds the exact historical common law position with respect to the
acts committed by third parties against the fetus.
Currently, however, the positions of the courts regarding this issue
has evoked less controversy. Without considering legislative ac-
tions,49 only three jurisdictions have held that a third party can be
convicted of criminal homicide for killing a fetus.50 It should be noted
that these cases have all dealt with fetuses that have reached viabil-
ity51 rather than the earlier stage of quickening. These cases will be
discussed in more detail in Part VI of this Comment.
IV. CASES DISCUSSING WHETHER TO CRIMINALIZE
MATERNAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE
Many states have prosecuted pregnant women for harming their
fetuses by using illegal drugs during their pregnancies. 52 The only
state to uphold a conviction on such a charge is South Carolina in the
case of Whitner v. State.53 Prosecutors have tried a number of novel
approaches in an attempt to convict women for drug use in this con-
text. The two most prevalent theories involve prosecuting a woman
under state "child" endangerment statutes54 or charging a woman
48. Id. (citing Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the
Status of the Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14
N.Y.L.F. 411, 504 (1968)("The common law itself prohibited... hanging a preg-
nant felon... because the life of [the fetus] would thereby be taken, although it
did not call the offense murder or manslaughter")).
49. A number of legislatures have created statutes making it a felony to commit feti-
cide, which is "the killing of an unborn fetus." See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80
(1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (West 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West
1996); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-32.5 (West 1996).
50. Massachusetts, Ohio, and South Carolina are the only 3 judicial jurisdictions to
allow a third party to be convicted of criminal homicide for killing a fetus. See
Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1989); Williams v. Marion
Rapid Transit, 87 N.E.2d 334 (Ohio 1949); State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C.
1984).
Cases in which a third party was not allowed to be convicted of criminal homi-
cide include: Meadows v. State, 722 S.W.2d 584 (Ark. 1987); Keeler v. Superior
Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970); In re A.W.S., 440 A-2d 1144 (N.J. 1981); State v.
Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1989); State v. Amaro, 448 A.2d 1257 (R.I. 1982); State
ex rel Atkinson v. Wilson, 332 S.E.2d 807 (W. Va. 1984).
51. Viability has been defined as the point when the fetus can exist apart from its
mother, roughly around the beginning of the third trimester. See generally
Greater Southeast Community Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d 394 (D.C. 1984).
52. See infra notes 54-55.
53. No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164 (S.C. July 15, 1996).
54. See Reinesto v. State, 894 P.2d 733 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Reyes v. Superior Court,
141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); Kentucky
v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993); State v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Ge-
1997]
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with the "delivery"55 of a controlled substance to a "child" via the um-
bilical cord while in the womb or a few moments after birth. Under
both approaches, the issue usually has boiled down to whether the fe-
tus or the newborn was a "child" within the legislative intent and pro-
tection of the statute. Usually the woman was prosecuted under a
statute very similar to that in Whitner.56
For example, in State v. Gray,57 a woman was charged with child
endangerment because she ingested cocaine several times after the
fetus had reached viability. The child was born addicted to cocaine.
The case centered around the interpretation of whether a fetus was a
"child" within the protection of the statute. The statute made it a
crime for a person "having custody or control.., of a child under the
age of eighteen... [to] create a substantial risk to the health or safety
of the child.".8 The Ohio Supreme Court noted that the language of
the statute did not specifically reference a fetus, but that "the [Ohio]
legislature [was] undertaking the thorough investigation necessary to
resolve this important and troubling social problem."5 9 The court
stated that a "court should not place a tenuous construction on [a]
statute to address a problem to which the legislative attention is al-
ready directed."60 Furthermore, the legislature, rather than the
courts, must impose a legally cognizable duty of care on pregnant wo-
men to their developing fetuses. 6 ' Therefore, the Gray court con-
cluded that the statute in question did not reach a pregnant woman's
act of ingesting a controlled substance while pregnant.
In State v. Gethers,62 a Florida woman was charged with child
abuse because of her substance abuse during the last months of her
pregnancy.63 The court noted that it was clear from legislative history
that the legislature considered and rejected a specific statutory provi-
sion authorizing criminal penalties against mothers ingesting drugs
neva City Ct. 1992); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992); Collins v. Texas,
890 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994); State v. Dunn, 916 P.2d 952 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1996).
55. Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fa. 1992); State v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Sheriff, Washoe County, Nev. v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596 (Nev.
1994).
56. The statute in Whitner made it a crime for "[any] person who has the legal cus-
tody of [any] child ... without lawful excuse, to refuse or neglect to provide...
proper care and attention.., for [such] child." S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (Law.
Co-op. 1993).
57. 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992).
58. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(A) (Baldwin 1989).
59. State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 713 (Ohio 1992).
60. Id. (quoting People v. Gilbert, 324 N.W.2d 834 (Mich. 1982)).
61. Id.
62. 585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
63. Gethers was charged with "willfully or by culpable negligence ... permitting
physical or mental injury to [a] child." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.04(1) (West 1987),
amended by FLA. STAT. ch. 96-322 (1996).
[Vol. 76:319
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
during pregnancy.64 Furthermore, criminally prosecuting mothers
who give birth to drug dependent babies "conflicts with public policy
underlying Florida's child welfare laws."6 5 The court stated that
"criminal prosecution would needlessly destroy the family by possibly
incarcerating the child's mother when alternative measures could
both protect the child and stabilize the family."6 6 As a result, the
court held that "child" did not encompass a fetus for the purposes of
the statute in question.
In State v. Collins,67 a Texas woman was charged with "recklessly
injuring a child" because she ingested cocaine during the last trimes-
ter of her pregnancy.68 The newborn suffered a variety of withdrawal
symptoms. The woman argued that including a fetus in the interpre-
tation of "child" would violate the long-standing rule that "due process
... forbid[s] penal laws that do not give reasonably clear notice to the
public... of what behavior is being criminalized." 6 9 The State argued
that such an interpretation would not be void for vagueness because
the woman could have reasonably foreseen the results of smoking co-
caine during her pregnany.7O The court found the State's argument
unpersuasive because the issue was not whether the woman knew
that her acts may harm the fetus, but whether she could be reason-
ably presumed to know that her conduct violated a criminal law.
71
The court noted that no legislation existing in Texas at the time of the
woman's actions mentioned the rights of the unborn in any context
other than abortion.7 2 In addition, the case law in Texas had limited
the application of drug related and penal code crimes to conduct com-
mitted after the child was born.7 3 The court held that the woman had
inadequate notice that her actions were criminally proscribed, and
therefore interpreting "child" to mean a fetus in this context would
violate notions of due process.
74
In New York, a person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a
child when he or she "knowingly act[s] in a manner likely to be injuri-
ous to the physical, mental, or moral welfare of a child less than sev-
64. State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140, 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
65. Id. at 1143 (stating that Florida's main concern is "to preserve the family life of
the parents and children, to the maximum extent possible, by enhancing the pa-
rental capacity for adequate child care").
66. Id. See also Brian C. Spitzer, A Response to "Cocaine Babies"-Amendment of
Florida's Child Abuse and Neglect Laws to Encompass Infants Born Drug Depen-
dent, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. RPv. 865 (1987).
67. 890 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994).
68. Id. at 895.
69. Id. at 897 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 898.
19971
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enteen years old."75 In State v. Morabito,76 the State charged a
woman under this criminal statute when she ingested cocaine days
before she delivered the child. The woman's use of cocaine was alleged
to have induced early labor and caused the newborn to suffer from
severe withdrawal symptoms. 7 7 The woman argued the statute was
vague and failed to provide the requisite notice of exactly what actions
were criminal. In addition, she argued that the interests of a fetus
were not furthered by interpreting "child" to include fetus in this
context.78
The Morabito court acknowledged the long-standing rule requiring
strict construction of criminal statutes and resolving any ambiguities
in favor of the individual.79 The court held that the application of the
word "child" in this context created an ambiguity that failed to inform
"the reasonable man.., a sufficiently accurate concept of what [was]
forbidden."80 Furthermore, the court noted that whenever the legisla-
ture in New York passed legislation concerning the unborn, it had
done so expressly.8 ' In this case, the statute had been recently
amended three times and the New York Legislature did not expressly
include a fetus or the unborn within the ambit of the statute.8 2 More-
over, "whether or not the State should intervene on the activities of
pregnant women, when it should intervene,... [and] how it should
intervene... are complex legal and social questions that can only be
debated and fully considered by the legislature."83 Allowing this type
of prosecution would blur lines defining other criminal acts and there-
fore render the statute vague.8 4 As a result, the court did not inter-
pret "child" to mean a fetus within the purview of the statute.
In State v. Reinesto,85 an Arizona woman was prosecuted for in-
gesting heroin, which caused her to give birth to a heroin-addicted
child. The woman was charged with violating a child endangerment
statute that prohibited a person from "causing [any] child. . . to suffer
physical injury."86 "Child" was defined as "an individual who is under
eighteen years of age."8 7 The court first held that if the word "child" in
the statute was ambiguous and susceptible to more than one interpre-
75. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 260.10(1) (McKinney 1990).
76. 580 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Geneva City Ct. 1992).
77. Id. at 844.
78. Id. at 845.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 846.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 845 (quoting In re State v. Tina Andrews, No. 89.9078 (Ohio Farn. Ct.
1989).
84. Id. at 847.
85. 894 P.2d 733 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
86. APiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3623.B (West 1992).
87. Id. § 13-3623.A(2).
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tation, "the rule of lenity requires us to resolve any ambiguity in favor
of the defendant."8 8 The court, however, did not find the term ambig-
uous. Rather, the plain language of the statute was held on its face to
proscribe acts directed only at children in being and not fetuses.89
The court found it highly persuasive that when the legislature had
intended to address an issue regarding the unborn, it had done so ex-
pressly.9 o Because the statute in this case did not expressly reference
"child" to include a fetus, the court held that the woman could not
reasonably have known she could be prosecuted for her prenatal
conduct.9 1
In addition, the court discussed the many other types of prenatal
conduct, both legal and illegal, that could result in more harm to the
fetus than that which occurred in Reinesto.9 2 Allowing prosecution for
child endangerment under the statute would render it vague and
would not be "consistent with the dictates of due process." 93 Finally,
the court noted that the Arizona legislature proposed a bill that would
have expanded the child endangerment statute to include injuries
caused to a fetus resulting from a pregnant woman's use of illegal
drugs or alcohol during pregnancy.94 The legislature, however, did
not pass the bill, thus demonstrating the legislature's intent to not
include fetus in the statutory definition of "child."95 As a result, the
court dismissed the charges against the woman.
In Commonwealth v. Pellegrini,9 6 a Massachusetts woman was
charged with endangering the life of a "person under the age of eight-
een" because she ingested cocaine after the fetus reached viability.
Tests performed immediately after the birth of the child showed co-
caine in the newborn's system.9 7 The court recited its previous case
law defining a viable fetus as a "person" for purposes of criminal pros-
88. Reinesto v. State, 894 P.2d 733 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
89. Id.
90. For example, the manslaughter statute was amended to prohibit "knowingly or
recklessly causing the death of an unborn child at any stage of its development by
any physical injury to the mother of such child...." Amiz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1103.A(5) (West 1993).
91. Reinesto v. State, 894 P.2d 733, 736 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
92. For example, the court stated that studies have shown that consuming alcohol
can cause mental retardation and is the leading cause of low birth weight, which
is a major factor in infant mortality. Also, a woman's failure to obtain proper
prenatal care or maintain a proper nutritional balance can have disastrous conse-
quences. The court reasoned that allowing a state to define the crime of child
abuse according to the health of the newborn would subject mothers to criminal
liability for engaging in all sorts of legal and illegal activities during pregnancy.
Id. at 737.
93. Id.
94. See H.B. 2054, 41st Leg., 1st Sess., 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws.
95. Reinesto v. State, 894 P.2d 733, 736 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
96. No. 87970 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990).
97. Id. at 2.
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ecutions involving acts committed by third parties.98 The court noted,
however, that neither the statute nor any other criminal statute had
ever been applied against a mother in the special mother-fetus rela-
tionship.9 9 Furthermore, "the specific language of the statute does not
encompass the circumstances presented in this case."10 0 Also, nothing
in the statutory history of the statute would permit "this strained con-
struction."' 0 Therefore, the court in Pellegrini did "not permit the
destruction of this relationship by the prosecution."'10 2
The cases charging a woman with "delivering" a controlled sub-
stance to a fetus have been dismissed for similar reasons. For exam-
ple, the Nevada Supreme Court decided the issue of whether a statute
criminalizing child endangerment applies to a mother's prenatal sub-
stance abuse that results in the transmission of an illegal substance to
her child through the umbilical cord after the birth of the child.103
The court in Sheriff, Washoe County, Nevada v. Encoei 04 noted that
penal statutes should be "so clear as to leave no room for doubt as to
the intention of the legislature.1os Furthermore, where a reasonable
doubt exists as to whether the person charged with a violation of its
provisions is within the statute, that doubt must be resolved in favor
of the individual.106 Applying these rules of construction, the Encoe
court held that prosecuting a mother for the delivery of a controlled
substance to her child through her umbilical cord would violate no-
tions of due process because it would be "a strained and unforeseen
application of [the statute].P107 Therefore, the court dismissed the
charge.
The last two cases addressed herein involve charges brought under
a similar statute to that in Encoe. Johnson v. Statei0 8 and State v.
HardylO9 involved pregnant women who had ingested crack cocaine
on the morning they were in labor and the night before. The trials
dealt with extensive medical testimony concerning whether cocaine
was actually delivered to the baby from the time it was born to the
time the umbilical cord was cut. Yet the courts did not focus on the
98. Id. at 10.
99. Id. at 10, 16.
100. Id. at 10.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 16.
103. Sheriff, Washoe County, Nev. v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596 (Nev. 1994). Encoe was
charged with "delivering" drugs to her fetus and thereby "willfully causing] a
child who is less than 18 years of age to suffer... abuse or neglect." NEv. Rv.
STAT. § 200.508(1) (1992).
104. 885 P.2d 596 (Nev. 1994).
105. Id. at 598.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
109. 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
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burden of proving actual delivery. Rather, in Johnson, for example,
the court held that the legislature simply did not intend the statute to
cover this situation and the current statute on its face did not provide
adequate notice to the defendant.11o Both cases also discussed the
harmful social ramifications of this type of prosecution."' Therefore,
the charges were dismissed in both cases.
V. THE FACTS AND HOLDING OF WHITNER
In early 1992, Cornelia Whitner was charged with criminal child
neglect for causing her baby to be born with cocaine in its system.
Whitner ingested cocaine several days before giving birth to her child.
The South Carolina child neglect statute, section 20-7-50, stated that
it was a crime for "[any person having the legal custody of any child
... without lawful excuse, to refuse or neglect to provide... proper
care and attention for such child ... ."112 The South Carolina legisla-
ture defined "child" as a "person under the age of eighteen."113 The
issue in Whitner was "whether a viable fetus is a 'child' for purposes of
the [child neglect statute] ."114 While two judges dissented, the major-
ity in Whitner held that a viable fetus was a child within the statute
and upheld Whitner's sentence of eight years in prison.115
In analyzing whether a viable fetus was a "child," the court noted
that "in interpreting a statute, this court's primary function is to as-
certain the intent of the legislature."116 If the language of the statute
is clear, the legislative intent must be determined from the language
itself.ll7 The statute must be viewed in conjunction with the purpose
of the entire statutory scheme rather than as an isolated clause.118
Further, the court recognized the long-standing rule that criminal
110. The Johnson court paid special notice to a bill that would have broadened the
definition of "harm" to include physical dependency of a newborn infant upon cer-
tain controlled drugs, but was amended to delete such language. The bill passed
as amended, demonstrating to the court that the legislature did not intend for the
statute to cover this type of action. Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1293 (Fla.
1992).
111. For example, the Johnson court noted the trial court's reasoning that pregnant
women would be deterred from using drugs and would be prompted to obtain
drug treatment if criminal sanctions were imposed for drug use. The supreme
court disagreed, however, reasoning instead "that prosecution of these women
would likely have the opposite effect." Id. at 1294.
112. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
113. Id. § 20-7-30(1).
114. Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *1 (S.C. July 15, 1996).
115. Id. at *7.
116. Id. at *1.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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statutes must be strictly construed and wherever ambiguous, the stat-
ute must be interpreted in favor of the individual.119
The court then discussed South Carolina's case law dealing with
the rights of a fetus. First, the court cited a case in which a fetus was
held to be a person within the scope of South Carolina's wrongful
death statute. 20 Next, the court reasoned that the word "person" as
used in the criminal code had been held to include a viable fetus with
respect to acts committed against the fetus by someone other than the
mother.12 l Although the dissent disagreed, the majority in Whitner
held that it would be incorrect "to recognize the viable fetus as a per-
son for purposes of homicide laws and wrongful death statutes but not
for child abuse."122 In addition, the majority stated that the policy of
South Carolina is "to concentrate on the prevention of children's
problems as [its] most important strategy."123 This "policy of preven-
tion" supported the majority's position that the legislature intended
the word "child" to include viable fetuses.' 24
Whitner argued that such an interpretation would allow pregnant
women to be prosecuted for an indeterminate number of acts, both
legal and illegal.' 25 The court disagreed, reasoning that a parent
could be charged with endangering the life of a child in being without
regard to whether the act is illegal in itself.126 The court held that
there was no reason why the law should apply any differently to a
viable fetus than to a child in being.12 7 The court noted, however, that
"we need not address this potential parade of horribles advanced by
Cornelia Whitner" because "this... is the only case we are called upon
to decide here."12 s
The court acknowledged the many decisions from other states hold-
ing that maternal conduct before the birth of the child does not give
rise to criminal prosecution under similar statutes.i 29 Yet, in the
119. Id. at *6.
120. Id. at *2 (citing Fowler v. Woodard, 138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1964)).
121. Id. (citing State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984)). Horne dealt with a de-
fendant who stabbed his pregnant wife in the neck, arms, and abdomen. As a
result, the fetus was killed while still inside the womb. The defendant was con-
victed of voluntary manslaughter. It should be noted that Massachusetts and
Ohio are the only other jurisdictions that have actually convicted a defendant for
killing a fetus under a criminal statute. See supra note 50.
122. Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *3 (S.C. July 15, 1996).
123. Id.
124. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-20(C) (Law. Co-op. 1985)).
125. Id. at *4.
126. Id. For example, "a parent who drinks excessively could, under certain circum-
stances, be guilty of child neglect or endangerment even though the underlying
act-consuming alcoholic beverages-is itself legal." Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at *5.
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opinion of the Whitner court, the cases dealing with the issue of "deliv-
ery" were unpersuasive. 13 0 Furthermore, cases construing the term
"child" were distinguishable "because those cases were decided in
states having different bodies of case law."131 The only case the court
actually distinguished, however, was Commonwealth v. Pellegrini.1
3 2
The court recognized that Massachusetts had similar case law in that
a viable fetus was held to be a "person" for tort claims and homicide
prosecutions. 1 33 Although the case law was similar, the Whitner court
held that "the rationale underlying our body of law-protection of the
viable fetus-is radically different from that underlying the law of
Massachusetts."134 Therefore, the court found the holding in Pel-
legrini unpersuasive.
The court further reasoned that its holding did not violate the rule
of lenity requiring ambiguities to be interpreted in favor of the indi-
vidual. According to the court, the statute and more specifically the
word "person" was unambiguous.13 5 As a result, the court held that
"the rule of lenity does not apply."13 6
VI. ANALYSIS
A. Violations of Legislative Intent and the Doctrine of
Separation of Powers
The Whitner court accurately stated that "the court's function is to
ascertain the intent of [the] legislature" when interpreting a stat-
ute.'3 7 Unfortunately, the court's inquiry as to legislative intent re-
garding South Carolina's child neglect statute was wholly inadequate.
As set forth by the dissent, it appears that the majority insufficiently
weighed the eleven different occasions prior to Whitner when the
South Carolina Legislature proposed bills that would have amended
this statute to expressly create a separate crime for a pregnant woman
to ingest an illegal substance while she was pregnant. 13s On each oc-
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. See Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990).
133. Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *5 (S.C. July 15, 1996). See also
Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984)(holding that a viable fetus
is a person for purposes of vehicular homicide); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975)(holding that a viable fetus is a person within the
wrongful death statute).
134. Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *5 (S.C. July 15, 1996). The
court found a substantial difference between Massachusetts' policy of protecting
parental interest in a fetus and South Carolina's policy of protecting the viable
fetus itself. Id.
135. Id. at *6.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *1.
138. Id. at *9 (Moore, J., dissenting).
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casion the legislature rejected such a proposal. The court could not
have asked for more assistance in performing its function to ascertain
the intent of the legislature than these eleven rejected proposals.' 3 9
Nevertheless, the majority in Whitner ignored the proposed bills based
on the concept that the present acts of the legislature do not cast a
definitive light on the legislature that enacted the statute in ques-
tion.' 40 In other words, the majority implied that even though the
current legislature obviously did not intend for the statute to apply to
the case at hand, it did not mean that the legislature that enacted the
original statute also had that same intention.
To dismiss the clear intent of the current legislature on such a
premise is inappropriate for at least two reasons. First, when the
early forms of the statute were drafted, it is unlikely that the legisla-
ture even considered the application of the statute to the facts of
Whitner. When the statute was first introduced decades ago, prenatal
substance abuse was not the focus of national attention, as it is to-
day.' 4 ' To demonstrate, no other jurisdiction at that time decided a
case or passed a statute referencing a fetus as being within the scope
of this type of statute.
Second, the South Carolina Supreme Court had itself previously
used bills proposed and rejected by the current legislature as a deter-
mining factor concerning the scope of a statute. 4 2 Other states, in
139. See, e.g., Enquist v. General Datacom, 587 A.2d 1029, 1040 (Conn. 1991)(Peters,
C.J., concurring)("[T]he rejection of an amendment indicates that the legislature
does not intend the statute to include the provisions embodied in the rejected
amendment."). See also Perlow v. Clerk of the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County, No. Misc. 788 (1-11), 1993 WL 226240 (Md. Tax Ct. Feb. 11, 1993)(con-
cluding that the legislature's rejection of an amendment to broaden the definition
of a statute's term indicates legislative intent that the statute does not include
the terms of the amendment); Hatheway v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, 459
N.W.2d 873 (Wis. 1990)(concluding that the legislature's rejection of an amend-
ment to broaden the definition of a statute's term indicates that the original defi-
nition should be used); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative
Inaction, 87 McH. L. RFv. 67, 84-89 (1988)(discussing courts' justified reliance
upon the current legislature's rejection of a bill as an indication of legislative
intent).
140. Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *3 (S.C. July 15, 1996).
141. See supra note 3. In 1977, only approximately 5,000 cases of newborns were ex-
posed to illegal substances in the United States.
142. State v. Blackmon, 403 S.E.2d 660,662 (S.C. 1991). Blackmon involved the inter-
pretation of a gambling statute. The statute restricted the use of gambling ma-
chines to "nonpayout machines." Rather than require patrons to actually insert
coins in the machine, the defendant personally received and paid money to people
who played the machine. The defendant argued that his conduct did not violate
the statute because "the machines themselves do not disperse money to the
player, but rather, a person does" and therefore fell within the exception for
'nonpayout machines." Id. The court found persuasive the legislature's proposal
and rejection of bills that would have expressly made the defendant's conduct
illegal. Id.
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similar circumstances, have recognized that bills proposed and re-
jected by the current legislature is a crucial and determining factor in
construing the breadth of a statute.14 3 Furthermore, in these states
the legislatures had proposed and rejected such bills on only a few
occasions, as opposed to the numerous bills proposed and rejected in
South Carolina. Therefore, by dismissing the action of South Caro-
lina's current legislature, the court in Whitner failed to discharge its
duty to ascertain the true legislative intent of the statute.
As a result, the court likely violated the doctrine of the separation
of powers by ignoring this long-standing rule recognized by every
other court in a similar situation. "[A] court should not place a tenu-
ous construction on a statute to address a problem to which the legis-
lative attention is readily directed ... ."144 This action violates the
separation of powers by invading what is the sole province of the legis-
lature.145 The decision to prosecute mothers for drug use during their
pregnancies concerns "special complex legal and social questions that
can only be debated and fully considered by the legislature.146 The
law recognizes a "unique relationship between a pregnant woman and
the developing fetus" that requires distinct statutes, separate from
criminal statutes already in place.147 Moreover, the South Carolina
Supreme Court has previously held that "[iut is for the legislature and
not this court" to rule on matters currently being argued by the legis-
lature.148 As noted by the California court in Keeler, "[flor a court to
simply declare.., that the time has now come to prosecute" a person
for a new crime that never before has been brought under a long-
standing statute is "to rewrite the statute under the guise of constru-
143. See, e.g., State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140, 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)(stating
that "it is clear that the Legislature considered and rejected a specific statutory
provision authorizing criminal penalties against mothers" for ingesting illegal
drugs during their pregnancies); Sheriff, Washoe County, Nev. v. Encoe, 885 P.2d
596, 599 (Nev. 1994)(finding it relevant that the Nevada legislature proposed and
rejected a bill that would have expressly made the ingesting of an illegal drug a
criminal act).
144. State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 713 (Ohio 1992)(quoting State v. Hardy, 469
N.W.2d 50, 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)). See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288
(Fla. 1992); Sheriff, Washoe County, Nev. v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596, 599 (Nev.
1994).
145. See State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 712-13 (Ohio 1992).
146. See State v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843, 845 (Geneva City Ct. 1992). See also
Spitzer, supra note 66 (discussing possible ways to protect unborn and newborn
children from their parenfs drug use).
147. State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 712 (Ohio 1992).
148. Lazerson v. Hilton Head Hosp., 439 S.E.2d 836 (S.C. 1994). Lazerson dealt with a
case in which the court was faced with interpreting "charitable organization" for
purposes of a statute. The court noted that it should not decide a matter properly
within the domain of legislative debate and held that "we defer to the legisla-
ture." Id. at 838.
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ing it."149 Such an act clearly violates the doctrine of separation of
powers. 150 As a result, the majority's decision in Whitner to ignore
this special relationship and instead independently manufacture a
new crime without deferring to the legislature violated the separation
of powers by invading what was the sole province of the legislature.
B. Possible Violations of Due Process Rights
Whitner argued that interpreting "child" to include a fetus would
violate her rights to due process because she did not have notice that
her conduct was criminal. Although all cases (except Whitner) would
agree with this position,15 1 it does not appear as though the United
States Supreme Court would reach a similar conclusion upon review
of the facts in Whitner.
Due process encompasses the basic principle that a criminal stat-
ute must provide warning of the conduct that it criminalizes.152 The
test for due process is whether the criminal statute fails to provide a
person of ordinary intelligence adequate notice that her contemplated
conduct is forbidden.153 Acts committed by the defendant must
clearly fall within the language of the statute for the defendant to
have received the required notice. 154 This notice requirement is re-
flected in the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex
post facto laws. 155
When analyzing whether the criminal statute provided Whitner
fair notice that her conduct was criminal, a court must first examine
the statute itself, along with the accompanying statutory scheme.
Then the court must examine the relevant case law.156 As the court in
Whitner recognized, the meaning and intent of a statute must first be
ascertained from the plain meaning of the statute's language. 157 But,
when the language is ambiguous and susceptible to differing construc-
tions, the long-standing rule of lenity requires that the court interpret
the language in a light most favorable to the defendant to avoid due
process violations.158
149. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 625-26 (Cal. 1970).
150. Id. at 626.
151. See, e.g., Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Sheriff,
Washoe County, Nev. v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596 (Nev. 1994); State v. Morabito, 580
N.Y.S.2d 843 (Geneva City Ct. 1992); Collins v. State, 890 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. App.-
El Paso 1994).
152. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. U.S. CONsT. art. I, §§ 9-10.
156. See generally Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
157. See Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *2 (S.C. July 15, 1996).
158. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Keeler v. Superior Court, 470
P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
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The child neglect statute in Whitner stated that it was a crime for
any person "having the legal custody of any child ... to refuse or ne-
glect to provide ... proper care and attention for such child . "159
Although improbable, it is worth arguing that this statute is similar to
that in the case of Lanzetta v. New Jersey.l60 The statute in Lanzetta
made it an offense "to be a gangster, defined as any one not engaged in
any lawful occupations, known to be a member of a gang consisting of
two or more persons."i16 The defendant in Lanzetta argued that his
conviction violated his due process rights because the meaning of the
word "gang" as used in the statute failed to provide him an adequate
description of the type of prohibited involvement.' 62 Citing several
dictionary definitions,' 6 3 the Lanzetta Court reasoned that "the pur-
poses of those constituting some 'gangs' may be commendable, as for
example, groups of workers engaged under leadership in any lawful
undertaking." 6 4 Furthermore, the Court noted that "the statute fails
to indicate what constitutes membership or how one may join a
'gang.'"i6 5 Therefore, Lanzetta held that the term "gang" and "the
terms [the statute] employs to indicate what it purports to denounce
are so vague, indefinite and uncertain that it must be condemned as
repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 6 6
Similarly, it can be argued that interpreting the term "child" to
mean a fetus also violates the Due Process Clause. On its face, the
statute in Whitner does not define a fetus as a child. Further, when
looking at the plain meaning of the word in most dictionaries, a
method of construction employed in Lanzetta, "child" does not by defi-
nition include a fetus.16 7 These common dictionary definitions, some
of which expressly state that "child" means "from birth" and none of
which include any reference to prenatal periods, arguably fail to pro-
vide a reasonably intelligent person fair warning that "child" means a
fetus.
The requirement of fair warning, however, "does not invalidate
every statute which a reviewing court believes could have been
159. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (Law. Co-op. 1995).
160. 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
161. Id. at 452.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 455 (citing the Oxford English Dictionary definition of "gang" as "[a]
number of workmen or laborers of any kind engaged on any piece of work under
supervision of one person; a squad; shift of men; a set of laborers working the
same hours").
164. Id. at 457.
165. Id. at 458.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., TnE SCRIBNER-BANTAI ENGLISH DIcTIoNARY 156 (rev. ed. 1991)(stating
that "child" means "offspring-, young boy or girl"). Very few dictionary definitions
include any reference to prenatal periods.
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drafted with greater precision."' 68 Most statutes will contain some
inherent vagueness, and regardless of the words used in these stat-
utes, uncertainties will surface.' 6 9 Applying this logic, the Supreme
Court has held that a statute prohibiting "crimes against nature" is
sufficient to give the defendant fair warning that forcing a female to
allow the defendant to perform cunnilingus on her was a "crime
against nature."' 7 0 Following this line of reasoning, it seems likely
that the Supreme Court may allow the word "child" to include a fetus.
In Bouie v. City of Columbia,'7 ' the Supreme Court held that a
statute prohibiting trespass onto the lands of another after receiving
notice of the prohibited entry violated the due process rights of the
defendants. At first blush, Bouie may seem to support a finding that
Whitner's rights to due process were violated. Yet, a thorough exami-
nation of the case reveals a different conclusion. In Bouie, two Afri-
can-American college students took seats in a booth in a restaurant
and waited to be served. After they were seated, an employee of the
restaurant put up a chain with a "no trespassing" sign attached to it.
The restaurant manager called the police and reported that the two
students had breached the peace. The police officers arrested the stu-
dents and charged them with violating a statute forbidding "entry on
lands of another after notice prohibiting the same."1 72 The United
States Supreme Court noted that the South Carolina Supreme Court
had construed the statute to cover not only the act of entry on the
premises of another after receiving notice not to enter, but also the act
of remaining on the premises of another after receiving notice to
leave.' 73 The United States Supreme Court held that this construc-
tion amounted to an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of the statute
that violated the due process rights of the defendants.' 7 4
More importantly to the case of Whitner, however, the Bouie Court
also stated that it would hesitate to apply this rule when a defendant's
conduct was "improper or immoral."' 75 In other words, "applying the
rule against vagueness or overbroadness of a statute should depend on
the moral quality of [the defendant's] conduct."176 "In order not to
chill conduct within the protection of the Constitution and having gen-
uine social utility, it may be necessary to throw the mantle of protec-
168. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49 (1975).
169. Id. at 50.
170. Id.
171. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 353.
175. Id. at 362.
176. Id.
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tion beyond the constitutional periphery, where the statute does not
make the boundary clear."'1
7 7
The Court noted that there was nothing improper about the de-
fendants entering a restaurant to eat dinner in the properly desig-
nated area. Contrarily, the Court likely would consider Whitner's
drug abuse "improper or immoral" and therefore would conclude it
was without "genuine social utility" and falls outside the protection of
the constitution. As a result, the Court probably would be much less
inclined to find a due process violation in Whitner than in Bouie.
On the other hand, other facts may strengthen Whitner's due pro-
cess argument. For example, the remaining language in South Caro-
lina's child neglect statute, along with the entire statutory scheme,
seems to support a finding that "child" does not include a fetus. For
instance, as noted by Chief Justice Finney in his dissent, criminal lia-
bility is not aimed at every person who refuses to provide attention to
a child; rather, only legal custodians are targeted. This requirement
of legal custody suggests that "child" excludes a fetus because "legal
custody" is inapplicable to a fetus and interpreting it as such violates
South Carolina's own rules of statutory interpretation.
7 8
In addition, as the court in Whitner itself pointed out, statutes
must be interpreted in conjunction with other statutes in the entire
statutory scheme.17 9 The South Carolina child neglect statute refers
to section 20-7-490, which defines a neglected child as one "harmed or
threatened with harm." Section 20-7-490(C)(3) expressly defines
"harm."'s 0 As Chief Justice Finney noted in his dissent, these harms
can be visited only on a "child" in being and not a fetus. Therefore,
when reading the child endangerment statute in its entirety and in
context with its statutory scheme, it can be argued that Whitner did
not have notice that her conduct was illegal.
South Carolina case law also plays a vital role in determining
whether Whitner had notice that "child" included a fetus within the
scope of the statute. This body of law provides arguments both for and
against finding a violation of due process. First, examples of South
Carolina cases do not include a fetus in the definition of "child" when
interpreting South Carolina's Children's Code. For example, in Doe v.
Clark,'8 ' the court interpreted the word "child" for purposes of adop-
tion under two sections of the Code. Clark involved a couple who
wanted to adopt a pregnant woman's child. One section of the Code
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. See Whitnerv. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *8 (S.C. July 15, 1996)(Fin-
ney, C.J., dissenting)(citing Stone v. State, 443 S.E.2d 544 (S.C. 1994)(stating
that statutes must be interpreted so as to avoid illogical and absurd results)).
179. See id. at *2.
180. For example, "harm" is understood as failing to provide clothing and shelter.
181. Doe v. Clark, 457 S.E.2d 336 (S.C. 1995).
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required "the mother of the child" to sign a consent form before the
adoptive parents could take the child. Clark signed the requisite con-
sent form five days before she gave birth.182 After Clark gave birth to
the child, she changed her mind and wanted to keep the newborn
child. The issue before the court was how to define "child" for the pur-
pose of this statute. In short, the question was whether consent was
valid only if the child was in being or whether consent was valid once
the consent form was signed, even if before the birth of the child.'s3
In a very brief opinion, the court defined consent as the "informed and
voluntary release in writing of all parental rights with respect to a
child by a parent." 8 4 As to the term "child," the court stated that "a
child is defined as any person under 18 years of age."' 8 5 Without any
further analysis, the court held that "[i]n viewing the statutory lan-
guage as a whole, we conclude the legislature intended to require con-
sent after ... birth."186 Therefore, the court invalidated the consent
form and Clark was allowed to keep her child.
The language the court relied upon in Clark to define a "child" was
the same language relied upon in Whitner, although it orginated from
a different section in the code.1-7 Clark does not appear to provide
Whitner with notice that her conduct was criminal. Rather, it seems
to suggest that South Carolina's Children's Code requires that a
"child" be a person in being, not a fetus.'8 8
Two other South Carolina cases support a finding that Whitner
had sufficient notice that "child" includes a fetus. In Fowler v. Wood-
ward, 189 the court held that a viable fetus was a "person" for purposes
of the civil wrongful death statute, and in State v. Home,190 the court
held that a viable fetus was a "person" for purposes of the homicide
statute. The court in Whitner opined that these two cases provided
Whitner requisite notice that her conduct was criminal.'91 It can be
argued that these cases are more relevant than Clark, which did not
deal with a law designed to protect the fetus. Yet all courts that have
182. Id. at 336.
183. Id.
184. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1650(f) (Law Co-op. 1985)).
185. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1650(d) (Law Co-op. 1985)).
186. See id.
187. That is, both cases interpreted the same language: "a child is a person less than
eighteen years old." See Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164 (S.C. July
15, 1996); Doe v. Clark, 457 S.E.2d 336 (S.C. 1995).
188. See State v. Montgomery, 144 S.E.2d 797 (S.C. 1965). This case also dealt with
the South Carolina Children's Code. In Montgomery, the court held that a de-
fendant's indictment for nonsupport of his child was fatally deficient because it
did not contain the child's date of birth. The court required the child to be in
being, not a fetus.
189. 138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1964).
190. 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984).
191. See Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *3 (S.C. July 15, 1996).
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held contrary to Whitner also have previously held that "child" in-
cluded "fetus" within the wrongful death statute of their state.19 2 In
addition, some of these courts likewise had held that "child" included
fetus within their state criminal law,1 9 3 but concluded that the preg-
nant woman was denied the requisite notice that her conduct regard-
ing her fetus was criminal. The unique quality of the mother-fetus
relationship justified the conclusion.194 To apply existing criminal
statutes, such as the one in Whitner, to this special relationship would
be impractical, "a radical incursion upon existing law," and would ju-
dicially manufacture a new crime in violation of the woman's due pro-
cess rights.195 These courts reached this conclusion despite holding
that "child" included a fetus in previous civil and criminal cases.
Overall, resolving the issue of due process in Whitner is problem-
atic. It appears that it may be difficult to overcome the language in
Bouie regarding the utility of the actions of the party alleging a due
process violation. Nevertheless, it remains arguable that the lan-
guage of the statutory scheme and relevant case law failed to provide
Whitner the required notice that her conduct, as it related to her fe-
tus, was criminal.
C. Right of Privacy Issues Not Discussed in Whitner
The South Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged that Whitner
raised constitutional issues involving privacy rights. The supreme
court skirted these issues because "the Final Order [of the lower court]
makes no mention" of them.19 6 The Court acknowledged that
192. See, e.g., Wering v. Sandy, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (Ohio 1985)(holding that a cause of
action arises on behalf of a viable fetus when the viable fetus is negligently in-
jured in the womb and subsequently stillborn); Mone v. Greyhound Lines Inc.,
331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975); White v. Yup, 458 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1985).
193. See Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 (Mass. 1984)(holding that a
viable fetus was a "person" for purposes of a vehicular homicide statute where a
man ran over a woman who was 81h months pregnant and killed her fetus). See
also Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 87 N.E.2d 334, 337 (Ohio 1949)(stat-
ing that "[b]y the criminal law, such being the solicitude of the state to protect life
before birth, it is a great crime to kill the child after it is able to stir in the
mother's womb by any injury inflicted upon the person of the mother").
194. See State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992)(holding that "the unique relation-
ship between a pregnant woman and the developing fetus requires a separate
careful look at what activities [should] be deemed criminal and at what point in
the pregnancy"). See also Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip. op. at 16
(Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990)(holding that "there is no bond more intimate or
more fundamental than that between the mother and the fetus she carries in her
womb"). See generally Wilkins, supra note 18.
195. See Sheriff, Washoe County, Nev. v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596, 598 (Nev. 1994). See
also Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip. op. at 14 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct.
15, 1990); State v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Geneva City Ct. 1992); State v.
Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992).
196. Whituer v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *7 (S.C. July 15, 1996).
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Whitner's counsel commented to the lower court that its decision "vio-
lates the right of privacy."19 7 Yet the supreme court held that "[w] e do
not think this passing statement raises the constitutional issues."19 8
In light of the decision's magnitude, it is unfortunate for Whitner and
all women of South Carolina that the court chose not to discuss these
constitutional privacy rights issues. They will be addressed in this
Comment, however.
1. Should Strict Scrutiny Apply?
Although all of the courts analyzing the constitutional standard of
review in cases like Whitner have applied strict scrutiny without much
analysis,199 it is unclear whether the United States Supreme Court
would follow suit. For strict scrutiny to apply, the right that the state
seeks to infringe upon must be a "fundamental" right.200 The right to
privacy is the fundamental right implicated when a pregnant woman
is held criminally liable for neglecting her fetus.2O1
The fundamental right to privacy was first recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut. 20 2 In Gris-
wold, the Court held that a statute that prohibited married couples
from using contraceptives was unconstitutional because it interfered
with the right to privacy.2 0 3 The Supreme Court reinforced Griswold
in Eisenstadt v. Baird20 4 by voiding a Massachusetts statute that pro-
hibited the sale or distribution of contraceptives to unwed individuals.
In Eisenstadt, the Court stated that "[ilf the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.205
One year after Eisenstadt, the Court decided Roe v. Wade.2 06 In
Roe, the Court held that the fundamental right to privacy guaranteed
by the Constitution, "is broad enough to encompass a woman's deci-
sion whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."2 07 As a result, the
197. Id.
198. Id. at 7 n.6.
199. See generally Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15,
1990); People v. Bremer, No. 90-32227-FH (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1991); In re
Fletcher, No. N-3968/88 (N.Y. Family Ct. Oct. 7, 1988). See also James A. Free-
man, Prenatal Substance Abuse: Texas, Texans and Future Texans Can't Afford
It, 37 S. TEx. L. REv. 539 (1996).
200. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 151, 152 (1973).
201. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990).
202. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
203. Id. at 485-86.
204. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
205. Id. at 453.
206. 410 U.S. 151 (1973).
207. Id. at 153.
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Court also declared that restrictions on women's actions as they relate
to these child bearing decisions must be subjected to the "strict scru-
tiny" standard of judicial review.20 The Court repeatedly has held
that this standard requires the government to show that the chal-
lenged action is both "necessary to serve a compelling interest" and
the "least restrictive" means to achieve that interest.20 9 In Roe, the
Court noted that the state established important interests in preserv-
ing and protecting the health of the pregnant woman and the poten-
tial human life represented by the fetus. These interests, however,
were not compelling until after the fetus had become viable, roughly
at the end of the second trimester.2 10 Once the fetus reached viability,
the state could then proscribe abortion, except when the procedure
was necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
21 1
Courts have justified strict scrutiny applicaton in cases like
Whitner by reading Roe to require strict scrutiny whenever the state
seeks to protect the potential life represented by the fetus.
2 12 This is
appropriate, the courts reason, because if a law protects the rights of
the fetus in this context, it must necessarily implicate the mother's
right to privacy.2 13 This interpretation may read Roe too broadly,
however. That is, Roe, Griswold, and Eisenstadt all involve the right
to privacy in making decisions regarding intimate family planning
questions. Whitner, on the other hand, arguably involves a woman's
"right" to ingest illegal substances-a right that does not exist.
In this respect, Whitner more closely matches the facts of Bowers v.
Hardwick.2 14 Bowers involved a defendant who was charged with en-
gaging in sodomy21 5 with another man. The defendant argued that
the statute must be subjected to strict scrutiny because he a had "a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy."216  The
Supreme Court relied on Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe, noting that
they involved rights concerning either family, marriage, or procrea-
tion. The Court found that these rights were fundamental rights be-
cause they were "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradlition."217 "Accepting the decisions in these cases.., we think it
evident that none of the rights announced in those cases bears any
20.. Id. at 155.
209. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321-29 (1988).
210. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 151, 163 (1973).
211. Id. at 164-65.
212. See, e.g., Commonwealthv. Pellegrini, No. 87970 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990).
213. Id.
214. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
215. Id. at 188 n.1 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1982), which defined sodomy as
"submitting to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the
mouth or anus of another").
216. Id at 191.
217. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)(Powell, J.)).
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resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to en-
gage in acts of sodomy... ."218 The Court concluded that there is "[n]o
connection between family, marriage, or procreation ... and homosex-
ual activity...." 2 1 9 The right to perform sodomy, on the other hand, is
not "deeply rooted" in our society. Rather, "[p]roscriptions against
sodomy have ancient roots."220 Therefore, the Court did not subject
the sodomy statute to strict scrutiny because the statute did not impli-
cate a fundamental right.
Similarly, Whitner falls outside the category of those cases involv-
ing the right of privacy in the context of family, marriage, or procrea-
tion. The fact that Whitner was pregnant was merely incidental to
her drug use and not the focal issue as in cases like Roe. In some
cases, the woman using illegal substances may not have known she
was pregnant at the time of ingestion.221 Furthermore, ingesting
drugs, like performing sodomy, certainly is not a right "deeply rooted
in our society." In light of these distinguishing facts, the propriety of
applying strict scrutiny is less clear than the courts to this point have
made it. If the Supreme Court had employed a lower standard of re-
view, it is likely that laws criminalizing a mother's substance abuse
for harming her fetus would survive a constitutional challenge.222
2. If Strict Scrutiny Is Applied?
If the Supreme Court eventually finds that a fundamental right to
privacy is implicated in cases like Whitner and applies strict scrutiny,
it is questionable whether laws criminalizing a woman's prenatal drug
use would survive. Strict scrutiny requires that the state's interest be
"compelling" and that the means employed to serve that interest be
the "least restrictive" available.223 As established in Roe, which dealt
with an abortion statute, a state has an interest in "protecting the
218. Id. at 190-91.
219. Id. at 191.
220. Id. at 192.
221. See Victoria J. Swenson, Pregnant Substance Abusers: A Problem That Won't Go
Away, 25 ST. MARY's L.J. 623, 699 (1994)(stating that many drug-addicted wo-
men do not realize they are pregnant until well into their third trimester).
222. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996); Madsen v. Women's Health
Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994). These cases analyzed the 3 levels of scrutiny used
to assess the constitutionality of a governmental regulation. The lowest level of
scrutiny is the rational basis test, which inquires whether the government has
demonstrated a legitimate interest in that which is regulated and whether the
regulation itself is rationally related to serving the government's interest. The
intermediate level of scrutiny inquires whether the stated government interest is
significant and whether the regulation is substantially related to serving that
interest. The highest level of scrutiny, or strict scrutiny, is discussed supra sub-
section VI.C.1.
223. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
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potentiality of human life" represented by a fetus.224 In the context of
the abortion statute, that interest became compelling only at the time
of viability. 2 2 5 Since the state established a compelling interest at the
time of viability in Roe, the state's interest in Whitner must also be
compelling. That is, Roe involved protecting the fetus through abor-
tion restrictions and Whitner involved a pregnant woman using drugs,
both of which may result in the death of the fetus or permanent
mental retardation and gross physical deformities should the fetus
come "into being."2 2 6
The state also has the burden of showing that the means employed
to serve this compelling interest are the least restrictive available. To
employ the least restrictive means, the state must not "stifle funda-
mental personal liberties [of the woman] when the end can be more
readily achieved."2 27 A good argument can be made that the state can
serve its interest in protecting the fetus in a less restrictive manner
than criminal prosecution.
The first step in drafting the "least restrictive" means is to identify
the true problem. Imposing criminal sanctions ignores that continued
drug abuse impairs the capacity of pregnant women to make rational
decisions.2 28 It also "ignores the underlying problem of addiction and
the compulsive behavior it generates."2 29 In the vast majority of
cases, the pregnant woman does not intend to harm the fetus by in-
gesting drugs.2 30 As a result, imposing criminal sanctions simply is
not the answer. Rather, the state should "develop more effective alter-
native means," 2 31 such as means that "do not interfere with a wo-
man's right to privacy or destroy the fundamental relationship
between the mother and her fetus."2 32 Other examples include educa-
tion, accessible medical care, and drug treatment centers for pregnant
women.2 33
224. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
225. Id. at 163.
226. See supra Part II.
227. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
228. See People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)(Reilly, J.,
concurring).
229. Id.
230. Id. This also implies problems with mens rea requirements, which fall outside of
the scope of this Comment.
231. See Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip op. at 8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct.
15, 1990).
232. Id. See also Cheri Hass, Note, State v. Gray: De-Criminalization of Maternal
Drug Abuse or a Momentary Reprieve?, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 1013, 1035 (1995).
233. See Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip op. at 8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct.
15, 1990). See also Sheriff, Washoe County, Nev. v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596, 599
(Nev. 1994); Hass, supra note 232, at 1035.
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While "education and treatment is the only desirable remedy to
this problem,"2 34 much work must be done to make this remedy effec-
tive for pregnant women. For example, one study shows that of the
seventy-eight existing drug treatment centers in New York City, only
half allow pregnant women in the door.235 Several treatment centers
fear their actions will harm the fetus and thus subject them to legal
liability.236 One solution might be to grant to these treatment centers
immunity from some types of malpractice claims. 23 7 Even several of
the programs that accept pregnant women are improperly equipped to
meet these women's special physical and emotional needs. 23s
A few programs are specifically designed to deal with cases like
Whitner's. For instance, one program allows a pregnant woman to
voluntarily choose to enter the program.2 39 Before the treatment be-
gins, a thorough evaluation of the patient is performed. Then, based
on the evaluation, the woman is admitted on either an in-patient or
out-patient basis. The in-patient program treats complications and
withdrawal symptoms. The program also integrates education con-
cerning the effects of drugs and provides psychotherapy in the context
of pregnancy and parenthood. An attempt is also made to include the
woman's family if possible. After delivery, parenting and child devel-
opment classes are offered.
The results of this program have been very positive. Overall, ap-
proximately seventy percent of the hundreds of mothers in the pro-
gram have delivered newborns without any signs of drug addiction.24 0
It is estimated that half of the women who participate in the in-pa-
tient program permanently remain drug-free. 24 1 Furthermore, ap-
proximately eighty percent of the women in the program who return
to the center for a one-year evaluation show no signs of continued drug
use.24 2 In addition, the costs of this program are often less than the
costs of imposing criminal sanctions on these women. 24 3
234. Susan E. Rippey, Criminalizing Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 17 NEw
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CoNFINEMENT 69, 89 (1991). See also Hass, supra note
232, at 1035.
235. Rippey, supra note 234, at 89.
236. Wilkins, supra note 18, at 1437.
237. Id.
238. See Hass, supra note 232, at 1035.
239. See Wilkins, supra note 18, at 1438 n.208 (discussing Iennarella et al., A Compre-
hensive Treatment Model for Pregnant Chemical Users, Infants, and Families, in
DRUG USE, reprinted in DRUG USE IN PREGNANCY: MOTHER AND CHn 42 (I.
Chasnoff ed. 1986).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
[Vol. 76:319
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
Houston, Texas is the home of another "model" program.2 44 This
program is established as a residential drug treatment center
("Center"). The Center serves approximately 4,000 drug-using women
every year. The first phase of the program is designed to provide wo-
men with eleven days in a medical detoxification program. During
this period, a physician visits with the women two or three times a
day. The second phase of the program, depending on the stage of the
pregnancy, is an intensive sixty-day period during which drug coun-
selors teach the women about the effects their drug abuse has on the
fetus. After the fetus is delivered and released from the hospital, the
mothers and their infants enter the "New Life" stage of treatment.
During this stage, counselors work with the mothers to equip them
with tools necessary to exist independently from the Center. For ex-
ample, the Center places the women in housing, assists in job place-
ment, and provides educational services. While this program may
appear to involve significant costs, the average cost is only $3,500 to
treat one woman for the sixty-day second phase of the program.
245
The costs of imposing criminal sanctions and providing treatment for
one drug-addicted infant usually exceeds $3,500.246 These programs
capably demonstrate more efficient and less restrictive means of deal-
ing with the problem of prenatal drug abuse.
D. Policy Considerations
Even if the various state statutes pass constitutional muster, a va-
riety of policy considerations require a conclusion against the imposi-
tion of criminal sanctions in these types of cases. One consideration is
that potential prosecution will discourage these women from ob-
taining proper medical care.24 7 Enforcing a statute that punishes
pregnant women for drug use would necessarily require the participa-
tion of the medical community. 248 Presently, if a woman's conduct is
classified as abusive to the child, legal obligations arise for the medi-
cal staff. In fact, all states require physicians to report what they sus-
244. See Swenson, supra note 221, at 668 (discussing the "Model Treatment Program"
existing in Texas).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See Board of Trustees, American Med. Ass'n, Legal Interventions During Preg-
nancy: Court-Ordered Medical Treatments, and Legal Penalties for Potentially
Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA 2663, 2667 (1990)[hereinaiter
Legal Interventions]; Marcy T. Stovall, Note, Looking for a Solution: In re Valerie
D. and State Intervention in Prenatal Drug Abuse, 25 CoNm. L. REv. 1265, 1275-
80 (1993). See also Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1295-96 (Fla. 1992); State
v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140, 1142 (Fla. 1991).
248. See Legal Interventions, supra note 247, at 2667.
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pect is abusive behavior, and some states even hold medical personnel
liable for failing to report such activity.249
In light of this, it is 'logical to assume that pregnant women would
shy away from medical treatment for fear of prosecution. This fear is
not unfounded. For example, in one case, "uniformed police officers
wearing guns entered [the medical facility] . .. to investigate new
mothers suspected of cocaine abuse."250 This police action resulted in
the arrest of a pregnant woman who sought medical attention because
she ingested an illegal substance. The woman was charged with crim-
inal child abuse, although the charges were later dropped. Such police
actions certainly cause pregnant women to escape detection by avoid-
ing necessary medical attention.251 One comprehensive study indi-
cates that "the increasing fear of incarceration and other criminal
sanctions is discouraging pregnant women from seeking care. Women
are reluctant to seek treatment because of the possibility of punish-
ment. They also fear that their children will be placed in foster care
and they will never get them back."252 Furthermore,
Itihe number of women who are convicted for potentially harmful behavior is
likely to be small in comparison with the number of women who would be
prompted to avoid medical care altogether. As a result, the potential well be-
ing of many infants would be sacrificed in order to attempt to preserve the
health of a few.
25 3
Avoiding medical attention is especially harmful in the case of preg-
nant substance abusers because these women typically have more
health problems during their pregnancies than nonusers. 254 In some
cases, despite these serious problems, pregnant women have even cho-
sen to avoid medical attention during the time of delivery.255
In addition, police actions create an adversarial relationship be-
tween the pregnant woman and her physician, 256 requiring doctors to
249. Id.
250. Hass, supra note 232, at 1034 n.203 (citing Drugs During Pregnancy: Tragic, but
Not Criminal, N.J. L.J., May 31, 1990, at 9).
251. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); State v. Gethers, 585 So.
2d 1140 (Fla. 1991).
252. Dawn Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing
Women's Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 603 (1992)(citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, DRuG-EXPOSED INFANTS: A GENERATION AT RISK 9 (1990)). See also
Legal Interventions, supra note 247, at 2667 (stating that "[piregnant women will
be likely to avoid seeking prenatal or other medical care for fear that their physi-
cians' knowledge of substance abuse or other potentially harmful behavior could
result in a jail sentence rather than proper medical treatment").
253. See Legal Interventions, supra note 247, at 2667.
254. Wilkins, supra note 18, at 1402.
255. See State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140, 1143 (Fla. 1991). See also Hass, supra note
232, at 1034 (stating that prosecuting women in these cases "lead[s] to an escala-
tion in home deliveries").
256. Janna C. Merrick, Symposium on Maternal Substance Abuse During Pregnancy,
Policy Implications in the United States, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 57, 69 (1993).
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become agents of the criminal justice system.2 57 This deconstruction
of the doctor-patient relationship is critical because doctors depend on
patients' truthfulness concerning all aspects of their pregnancies. 2 58
If the truth is unknown to the doctor, disastrous consequences often
result.25
9
Another policy concern against the imposition of criminal sanctions
is that upon arrest, a pregnant woman is often subjected to environ-
mental conditions that are very hazardous to her health and to the
already fragile health of her fetus.260 Moreover, punishing a woman
after she gives birth inevitably undermines the state's interest of
keeping a family intact.2 61 In most cases, criminal sanctions would
separate the mother from the child. This separation would be justified
if it resulted in the eventual reunion of the child with a healthy
mother. Criminal sanctions, however, neither cure drug dependency
nor prevent future use.26 2 Therefore, not only is the mother separated
from her child, but this separation often becomes permanent and can
lead to increased deterioration to the mother's health.263
A concern that pregnant substance abusers may have more abor-
tions to avoid prosecutions raises additional policy considerations.
264
Based on the state's interest in protecting the fetus, many state legis-
latures specifically cite this problem as a basis for rejecting bills that
would criminalize women in these cases.2 6 5 Several courts also recog-
nize this as a significant problem militating against the imposition of
criminal sanctions.2 66 In addition, both the legislatures and courts ac-
knowledge that criminal sanctions in this context serve little if any
deterrence because harsh sanctions already exist for the use of an ille-
gal substance.2 6 7
257. Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization
of "Fetus Abuse," 101 Hnv. L. Rsv. 994, 1011 (1988).
258. See Hass, supra note 232, at 1034 n.203. See also Stoval, supra note 247, at 1278.
259. See Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1296 (Fa. 1992)(prosecuting a woman in
these situations "is counterproductive to the public interest as it may discourage
[her] from seeking prenatal care or dissuade her from providing accurate infor-
mation to health care providers out of fear of self-incrimination. This failure to
seek proper care or to withhold vital information concerning her health could in-
crease the risks to herself and her baby.").
260. See Legal Interventions, supra note 247, at 2667 (stating that women in jail for
long or short periods of time are subjected to generally filthy and unsanitary envi-
ronments, poor diets, and no access to exercise or fresh air).
261. See State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140, 1142 (Fla. 1991).
262. See Legal Interventions, supra note 247, at 2667.
263. Id.
264. See, e.g., Hass, supra note 232, at 1035.
265. See id. (discussing this issue in reference to the Illinois Legislature).
266. See, e.g., Sheriff, Washoe County, Nev. v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596, 599 (Nev. 1994).
267. See Legal Interventions, supra note 247, at 2667-68. See also Commonwealth v.
Pellegrini, No. 87970 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990); Wendy K. Mariner et al.,
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One final policy concern is that criminal sanctions against preg-
nant substance abusers "may open the floodgates" to prosecution of
pregnant women for an unlimited number of new "crimes."2 68 The
majority in Whitner did not address this argument, choosing instead
to make future determinations on a case-by-case basis.269 Nonethe-
less, the court failed to send pregnant women in South Carolina a
clear message as to what other acts may be criminal. For example,
will the court limit future prosecutions to only those cases in which
the woman has ingested illegal substances? How will the court re-
spond when pregnant women ingest legal substances, if legal sub-
stances damage a fetus more than illegal ones? 2 70 To what extent can
a woman smoke or consume alcohol before her actions become
criminal?
The majority's response, that "the same arguments can be made
against the statute whether or not the child has been born,"27l is inad-
equate because it ignores the obvious biological differences between a
fetus and an infant. That is, the fetus ingests whatever the mother
ingests, whereas after the child is born, the only effects these sub-
stances will have on the child are indirect. For example, when a
mother ingests cocaine or consumes alcohol, a child already in being
may not receive adequate food and shelter. However, it will not sus-
tain brain damage or mental retardation directly from the drug use.
Furthermore, a mother who has a child in being occasionally can con-
sume even excessive amounts of alcohol or smoke a pack of cigarettes
a day and still perform her functions as a mother in fine fashion. In
contrast, this use will likely have serious effects on the fetus if con-
ducted while the woman is pregnant. In this respect, Whitner pro-
vides little guidance to the women of South Carolina concerning what
conduct is in fact criminal.
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new crime with every new case as new facts are presented in each case.
269. See Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *4 (S.C. July 15, 1996).
270. See, e.g., Claire Infante-Rivard et al., Fetal Loss Associated with Caffeine Intake
Before Pregnancy, 270 JAMA 2940 (1993)(discussing the severity the harm
caused to a fetus by the consumption of alcohol, caffeine, and nicotine, and how it
is often worse than the effects of illegal substance abuse).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The problem of women subjecting their fetuses to the dangers of
illegal drugs continues to expand in the United States. Using a child
neglect statute to impose criminal sanctions on one of these women,
the court in Whitner likely violated the separation of powers doctrine
by creating a new crime under the guise of interpreting a criminal
statute. The court failed to sufficiently weigh the clear intention of
the legislature, which itself declined to pass eleven bills that would
have criminalized Whitner's conduct. While Whitner's claim of due
process violations would likely meet substantial resistance by the
Supreme Court because of the character of her drug usage, other fac-
tors might influence the Court to find in her favor. If the Court grants
certiorari, it remains uncertain as to what constitutional standard of
review it would apply. Regardless of whether laws like the one in
Whitner pass constitutional muster, imposing criminal sanctions on
these women fails to benefit the fetus, the mother, or society as a
whole.
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